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Abstract 
This paper analyses some of the economic issues related to Romania's ability to meet the Maastricht exchange rate criterion. 
Based on the experience of the countries which had already joined Euro zone, we identified that, beyond the standard 
fluctuation band of ± 15% officially required by ERMII, there is a strong preference for maintaining the exchange rate within 
a narrow band, with an upper margin of maximum +10 percent over the central rate.  On this background, a hypothetical 
participation of Romanian leu in ERM-II over two-year period is assessed using the framework developed by the European 
Central Bank and the European Commission. Simulations performed on daily data series for the last 24 months indicate that 
the nominal exchange rate of RON was relatively stable within the standard fluctuation band. Nevertheless, it significantly 
deviated from the pattern exhibited by the currencies that had fulfilled this criterion. Downwards pressures that characterized 
the developments of Romanian leu as well as the spikes in volatility of the exchange rate could signal an intensity of tensions 
inconsistent with the above mentioned criterion. 
 
© 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and peer review under responsibility of Emerging Markets Queries 
in Finance and Business local organization. 
Keywords: Maastricht convergence criteria;  ERM II; euro adoption.  
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +40-264-41-86-52/3/4/5. 
E-mail address: ioan.trenca@econ.ubbcluj.ro. 
 2015 Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Selection and peer-review under responsibility of Asociatia Grupul Roman de Cercetari in Finante Corporatiste
1179 Ioan Trenca et al. /  Procedia Economics and Finance  32 ( 2015 )  1178 – 1187 
1. Introduction 
Euro adoption is a long and difficult process. Firstly, the economies of candidate states (“Member States with 
derogation”) should be capable of fulfilling the conditions incorporated into the EU Treaty at in 1992 at the 
Maastricht summit, known as nominal convergence criteria .RPiUHN/XERãýHFK=GHQČNDQG+RUYiWK5RPDQ
2003. 
The exchange rate stability is one of the five nominal convergence criteria. It requires the euro-candidate 
country to participate in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II) for at least two years. During this period of 
time, it should observe the normal fluctuation margins of ± 15% around the central parity, without severe tensions 
and without devaluing its currency’s bilateral central rate against the euro on its own initiative. 
This article focuses on the framework applied by ECB and EC in their Convergence Reports for assessing the 
exchange rate criterion. Afterwards we used the same framework to analyze whether Romania would have 
ensured a successful experience in ERM II over the last two years.  
2. A historic perspective over ERM II 
In June 1997, the European Council decided to set up an exchange rate mechanism to replace the European 
Monetary System when the third stage of economic and monetary union would have started on 1 January 1999. 
This mechanism named ERM II was designed to protect the single market against excessive exchange rate 
fluctuations between the euro and the other EU currencies, which could disrupt trade flows between EU Member 
States. A sustainable degree of exchange rate stability would provide a stable economic environment necessary 
for the good functioning of the single market. 
At the core of ERM II is an arrangement stipulating that the currency of participating country should be linked 
to the euro by setting up a central rate (or parity) and a fluctuation band of ± 15% around this parity. The 
mechanism is support both by national central bank of the participating country and by European Central Bank. 
They agree to intervene in a coordinated manner in order to maintain the exchange rate within the margins of the 
band. 
While EU authorities considers that ERMII should be seen a “training room” for testing the consistency of 
policies, encouraging necessary adjustment and helping to achieve convergence, most acceding countries regard 
this mechanism as a “waiting room” Backé P., Thimann C., Arratibel O., Calvo-Gonzalez O. et al ,2004. ERM II 
is the successor of the original ERM that stood at the foundation of European Monetary System. The initial ERM, 
which operated between EU Member States before launching the single currency, was based on the same idea of 
having a sustainable degree of exchange rate stability to provide a stable economic environment necessary for the 
good functioning of the single market. There was a parity grid for all the currencies and a fluctuation band, around 
bilateral central parities.  
 
Fig. 1. ERM II 
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When the Treaty was conceived, the ‘normal fluctuation margins’ were ±2.25%. Amid the major currency 
turbulence during 1992-1993 in the context of the uncertainties related to the Maastricht Treaty ratification in 
Denmark and in France, a decision was taken in August 1993 to widen the fluctuation margins to ±15%.  
3. The assessment framework for the exchange rate stability 
The fulfillment of the Maastricht convergence criteria is assessed both by European Commission (EC) and 
European Central Bank (ECB). At least once every two years, or at the request of a euro-candidate Member State, 
each of the two institutions prepares a Convergence Report that is submitted to the Council of the European 
Union on the progress made in the fulfillment by the Member States of their obligations regarding the 
achievement of Economic and Monetary Union. Two Member States, namely Denmark and the United Kingdom, 
have a special status and therefore Convergence Reports for them only have to be provided if they so request. 
Since no such request has been made, the examination of economic convergence never covered Denmark and the 
United Kingdom. 
In producing their Convergence Reports, both EC and ECB are referring to the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter the “Treaty. With regard to exchange rate 
developments, Treaty provisions (Article 140) require the fulfillment of the following criterion: “the observance 
of the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European Monetary 
System, for at least two years, without devaluing against the euro”. This paragraph is further elaborated by Article 
3 of Protocol (No 13) on the convergence criteria (referred to in Article 140 of the Treaty), stipulating  that: “The 
criterion on participation in the Exchange Rate mechanism of the European Monetary System referred to in the 
third indent of Article 140(1) of the said Treaty shall mean that a Member State has respected the normal 
fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange rate mechanism on the European Monetary System without 
severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not 
have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against the euro on its own initiative for the same period.” The 
key aspects of the examination with regard to exchange rate developments that EC and ECB consider in their 
Convergence Reports are as follows:  
 
x Whether the country has participated in the ERM/ERM II “for at least the last two years before the 
examination”, as stated in the Treaty; 
x With regard to the “normal fluctuation margins”, emphasis is placed on exchange rates being close to the 
ERM/ERM II central rates; 
x The issue of “severe tensions” is generally addressed by examining the degree of deviation from the central 
parity, by using as indicators the short-term interest rate differentials, volatility and by considering the role 
played by foreign exchange interventions. 
 
The interpretation of the criterion, in particular of the concept of “normal fluctuation margins” become less 
straightforward, while a large degree of ambiguity was introduced by the EC. In its 2000 Convergence Report, 
the Commission mentioned that one condition to be respected in fulfilling the exchange rate criterion would be 
the following: “Exchange rate to have been maintained within a fluctuation band of ±2.25% around the currency's 
central parity against the median currency in the context of the ERM and against the euro in the context of the 
(50+RZHYHU WKH H[WHQW WRZKLFK D EUHDFK RI WKH  IOXFWXDWLRQ EDQGZRXOG FRUUHVSRQG WR VHYHUH
tensions would take account of a range of relevant considerations. A distinction is to be made between exchange 
rate movements above the 2.25% upper margin and movements below the 2.25% lower margin”. Papaspyrou 
(2004), an author familiar with the assessment methodology used by the Commission in 2000, suggested the 
judgment applied by the EC regarding the exchange rate criterion is shaped by the following arguments:  “If a 
currency has stayed within the 2.25% fluctuation margin from its central rate during the relevant two-year period, 
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it can be assumed that the requirements of exchange rate stability and absence of severe tensions are met. In the 
event of depreciation greater than the 2.25%, there will be no automatic presumption of instability or severe 
tensions, but an examination of other relevant aspects will be made in order to form a judgment on these issues. 
(…) exchange rate movements above the 2.25% margin (i.e. involving an appreciation) would be acceptable. In 
conclusion, there is adequate scope for judgment in each case, while respecting the provisions of the Treaty and 
the ERM II Resolution regarding the exchange rate criterion.” 
In its Convergence Reports produced since 2004, the EC makes the following statement, that seems to confirm 
the abovementioned interpretation: “In assessing compliance with the exchange rate criterion, the Commission 
examines whether the exchange rate has remained close to the ERM II central rate, while reasons for an 
appreciation may be taken into account, in accordance with the Common Statement on Acceding Countries and 
ERM2 by the Informal ECOFIN Council, Athens, 5 April 2003”. 
In an official document produced for the government, Czech National Bank (2003) states that, following 
consultations with the competent EU and ECB authorities, fulfillment of the criterion requires the exchange rate 
to have been maintained within a fluctuation margin of ±2.25% (i.e. narrower than the standard band) around the 
central parity in ERM II If the exchange rate moves outside this band, a distinction is to be made between a 
breach of the upper margin and a breach of the lower margin (a breach of the upper margin being implicitly more 
admissible). 
4. The Experience of Acceding Countries in ERM II 
Without diving into much detail, this section analyses the experience of the Members States that have joined 
euro-area after passing throughout ERM II, notably that of Greece and Slovakia, from the perspective of the 
exchange rate stability criterion, aiming to draw key lessons which may be useful to futures candidates. Since the 
launch of the single currency in eleven founding Members States on 1st of January 1999, only six other countries 
have adopted euro:  
 
x Greece adopted euro on 1st of January 2001, after joining the ERM on 16 March 1998 and ERM II on 31 
December 1998;  
x Slovenia entered in ERM II on 28 June 2004 and adopted euro on 1 January 2007;  
x Cyprus and Malta were in ERM II from 2 May 2005 till the adoption of euro on 1 January 2008; 
x Slovakia participated in ERM II since 28 November 2005 and joined euro-zone on 1 January 2009; 
x Estonia joined ERM II with effect from 28 June 2004 but euro was adopted only six years later, on 1 January 
2011; 
x Latvia had been participating in ERM II since 2 May 2005, for more than eight years and will adopt euro from 
1 January 2014. 
 
The experiences of Greece and Slovakia are more thoroughly analyzed as their prior currency arrangements 
were comparable with the one in place in Romania, while rest of the countries that went through ERM II started 
from a currency board or pegged exchange rates. The Greek drachma joined the ERM at a bilateral central parity 
of GRD 357 against the ECU and with an official fluctuation band of ±15% around this parity. On 1 January 
1999 the drachma joined ERM II, which replaced the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, at a central rate of 
GRD 353.109 against the euro, slightly different from the parity against the ECU. Greece succeeded to maintain 
a fluctuation band of ±15%, but EC considered that deviations from the central rates were sizeable as drachma 
was traded significantly above its central rate. Consequently, at the request of Greek authorities, the central rate 
was revalued from 17 January 2000 at GRD 340.75 against the euro. On the two-year period covered by 
Convergence Reports (1 April 1998 to 31 March 2000), the exchange rate of drachma was consistently above its 
central rate. The maximum deviations from the central rates against the euro were relatively high at 9.0% and 
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1.9% respectively, but occurred only above the central parity. Over the reporting period, the volatility of the 
exchange rate measured by annualized standard deviations of daily percentage changes, fluctuated between 1.1% 
and 9.5%. From Fig. 1. below it is clearly noticeable that drachma exchange rate had two phases over the 
reference period. Within the first phase that covered the first year of assessment (April 1998 t February 1999) the 
general trend was towards the appreciation of the drachma against the ECU/euro, while the second part of the 
reference period was characterized by a tendency towards the depreciation. 
Fig. 2. Deviation on Greek drahma 
 
Three-month interest rate differential vis-à-vis 3M Euribor had an overall declining trend although at a high 
nominal level: the spread in short-term interest rates narrowed from around 760 basis points on average in the 
three months ending in March 1999 to 540 basis points on average in the three months ending in March 2000  
 
 
Fig.  3. 3-M Athibor Spread  
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The Slovak koruna joined ERM II on 28 November 2005 with an initial central parity at 38.455 SKK/EUR 
and a standard fluctuation band of ±15%. The Convergence Reports issued by the European Commission and by 
the ECB covered exchange rate stability over the period from 19 April 2006 to 18 April 2008. The Slovak koruna 
appreciated considerably following ERM II entry. Therefore at the request of the Slovak authorities the central 
parity of the koruna was revalued from 38.455 to 35.4424 SKK/EUR (by 8.5 percent), with effect from 19 March 
2007. Even after that, the Slovak koruna was subject to some upward pressures, especially towards the end of the 
reference period, where it was consistently stronger than new central parity. The maximum deviations (based on 
daily values) on the appreciation side of the fluctuation band were 11.8% prior to and 8.9% after the revaluation 
Fig. 3.  
 
Fig. 4. Deviation of Slovak koruna 
For most of the reference period, short-term interest rate differential against the three month EURIBOR was 
insignificant. In fact, the spread amounted to -0.2 percentage points in the three-month period ending March 2008 
see Fig. 4.  
Fig. 5. 3-M Bribor Spread, Source: Eurostat, National Bank of Slovakia 
3-M Bribor spread 
(Calculated against 3-M Euribor, basis points, monthly values) 
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Within 2008 Convergence Report, the Commission states that, in assessing compliance with the exchange 
rate criterion, it “examines whether the exchange rate has remained close to the ERM II central rate, while reasons 
for an appreciation may be taken into account, in accordance with the Common Statement on Acceding Countries 
and ERM2 by the Informal ECOFIN Council”.  Therefore, the Commission stays away from making a direct link 
between the maintenance of currency within the fluctuation band of ± 15% and the compliance with the exchange 
rate criterion. Before ERM II entry, Slovenia had been using a de facto crawling peg exchange rate system (EC 
Convergence Report 2006). Inside ERM II, Slovenian tolar had traded in a very narrow range, close to its euro 
central rate, the actual fluctuation band being less than ±1 percent around central parity. 
Before entering ERM II, the Cypriot pound had been unilaterally pegged to the euro, its fluctuations being 
contained within relatively narrow margins. Since ERM II entry, the pound had remained close to its central rate 
on the strong side of the fluctuation band, with a maximum upward deviation from the central parity of 2.1 
percent. Maltese lira was pegged to a basket of three currencies consisting of the euro (most important in the 
basket), the pound sterling and the US dollar before joining ERM II. During the period spent within ERM II, the 
Maltese lira had traded at its central rate.Estonia had been applying a fixed exchange rate regime (i.e. currency 
board arrangement) for more than ten years before joining ERM II. Over the reference period covered by the 
Convergence Reports of EC and ECB, the Estonian kroon did not exhibit any deviation from its central rate. 
The Bank of Latvia had been implementing the lats pegging policy since February 1994 when the Latvian 
lats was pegged to the SDR currency basket. As of January 1, 2005 the lats has been pegged to the euro. Upon 
ERM II entry, the Latvian authorities unilaterally decided to keep the exchange rate of the lats within a fluctuation 
band of ±1% around the central rate. During 2007-2009, amid the large macro-imbalances combined with the 
effect of the global financial turmoil, the exchange rate peg came under significant pressure. An international 
financial assistance package was needed to calm market tensions, while the Bank of Latvia was forced to 
intervene heavily to protect the value of the lats. To this aim, more than 1/3rd of Bank of Latvia's foreign assets 
was sold between February and end-June 2009 to sustain the peg. In spite of these difficulties, the commitment 
of maintaining the lats within a narrow fluctuation band had been successfully accomplished. 
Several lessons could be drawn based on the experience of these countries:  
Firstly, apart from Greece and Slovakia, the rest of the countries had pursued particular exchange rate regimes 
%XLWHU:+*UDIHC., 2002 in which their currencies were strongly linked to the euro even before joining ERM 
II. Their approach is significantly different from free floating regime currently used by Romania. Nevertheless, 
the experience of Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Estonia and Latvia within ERM II could be relevant for one facet: it 
indicates a strong preference for maintaining their currencies within the margins of a very narrow corridor around 
the central parities. Secondly, while in ERM II, most of the currencies usually experienced upward pressures. 
The Latvian experience shows that the longer the stay in ERMII, the higher the risk of encountering currency 
turbulence related to the massive capital flows determined by exogenous or endogenous variables. Thirdly, even 
for larger countries that did not have in place special exchange rate arrangements such as Greece and Slovakia, 
the actual fluctuation band of their currency was narrower than the standard one of ± 15% around the central 
parities. We noticed that the appreciation of the exchange rate both of the Greek drachma and Slovak koruna near 
to the upper margin of 10% over the central parities triggered a revaluation of the central rates. The experience 
of these countries revealed a strong preference to lean the actual exchange rate towards a narrower band around 
the central rate, with asymmetric margins of -2.25% and +10%, confirming that the European authorities tend to 
take a stricter view in interpreting this criterion Égert B.,  Kierzenkowski R, 2003. A possible explanation could 
be that an official support for a wider fluctuation band has a high potential to discourage speculative attacks, 
offering more flexibility to the monetary authorities. One should not forget that ERM II is a successor of ERM 
which had original fluctuation bands of ±2.25%, margins had to be expanded to ±15% in order to accommodate 
speculation against the French franc and other currencies.Although Denmark has not entered the Euro zone (due 
to the ‘no’ vote in the referendum on the introduction of the single currency), the case of the Danish krone could 
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be relevant for the purpose of this paper: since 1 January 1999, when Danish krone has been part of the ERM II, 
its fluctuation band was set at ± 2.25% of the central rate.  
5. Assessment of the current fulfillment by Romania of the exchange rate stability criterion 
This section tries to answer the question whether Romania would have had theoretically fulfilled the exchange 
rate stability criterion for the last 24 months, from 3 October 2011 to 30 September 2013. Romania does not 
participate in ERM II, therefore the central rate of the leu against the euro has not been set yet. For the purpose 
of this assessment a hypothetical RON/EUR central parity was constructed as average of the daily exchange rate 
over the prior month before the reference period. This value used as proxy for central rate was set at RON 4.2829 
per euro. Simulations performed on daily data series over the reference period indicates that the Romanian leu 
has been subject to strong downward pressures. The developments of the leu exchange rate differ substantially 
from the pattern exhibit by the currencies of the countries that joined Eurozone, after passing through ERMII. 
This phenomenon is explained by the fact that the National Bank of Romania applied a free floating exchange 
rate regime, which is not compatible with the ERM II, but has a high potential to accommodate external shocks. 
The trend of Romanian leu reflects the evolution of foreign investor sentiment about the Central and Eastern 
European Countries, during the worldwide financial crisis.Although, the depreciation of Romanian leu against 
the euro over the reference period did not exceed the official fluctuation band, as it reached a maximum of -
8.53% against proxy used as hypothetical central parity, it significantly deviated outside the narrow band, 
especially downwards. Consequently such situation could be assessed as not being compliant with the condition 
of maintaining the exchange rate close to ERM II central rate without severe tensions. This conclusion is 
confirmed by the assessment of the exchange rate volatility of the Romanian leu vis-à-vis the euro, as measured 
by annualized standard deviations of daily percentage changes.Even though the volatility was mostly maintained 
at a relatively reasonable level during the last two years, it was still too high as compared with the peer countries. 
For instance, while Latvian lats exhibited a monthly average volatility against the euro between 0.5 percent to a 
highest 1.9 percent, in Romania this value fluctuated between 2 and 5 percent, with severe spikes on August 
2012, when it reached 9.72 percent, and July 2013 when amounted 12.32 percent. 
 
Fig. 6. Deviation of Romanian leu 
In the same time, short-term interest rate differentials for Romania against the three-month EURIBOR 
remained on average at a high level, as compared with spreads for the same peer country, i.e. Latvia ,Table1. 
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Table 1.  
Short-
term 
interest 
rates 
differenti
al* 
2010 2011 2012 2013 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Latvia 276 148 53 -2 -23 -64 -72 -12 39 25 29 33 28 21 7 NA 
Romania 650 530 574 524 436 391 393 451 372 394 500 543 526 391 355 NA 
*Differential in basis points between three-month interbank interest rates and the 3M EURIBOR 
 
Looking at these developments over an extended period that covers 2007-2013 (Fig. 1.), it is noticeable that 
the rate differential between 3-month EURIBOR and BUBOR were significantly narrowed after 2010, when 
Romanian economy surpassed the vulnerabilities induced by the global financial and economic crisis. In the 
context of gradual normalization of global economy, his tendency will continue, following the trend of CPI that 
is stabilizing around 2.5%, the level targeted by NBR.  
Fig. 7. 3-M Roborvs 3-M Rigibor, sourse Eurostat 
 
A comparison: 3-M Robor vs 3-M Rigibor spread 
(calculated against 3-M Euribor, basis points, Monthly values) 
Spread Latvia 
Spread Romania 
This is the period examined by COM and 
ECB within 2013 convergence reports 
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6. Conclusion 
The timing of the adoption of the single currency is mostly a political decision, but before the initiation the 
process, it is utmost important to understand which are the standards that the accession country is expected to 
fulfill. The Romania’s path toward the euro raises a series of questions related to the fulfillment of the Maastricht 
convergence criteria. One of the most important issues is related to how to interpret the exchange rate stability 
criterion. The evaluation of the Convergence Reports prepared by the EC and by the ECB combined with what 
can be learnt from the experience of the countries that passed throughout ERM II has shown the asymmetric 
nature of this criterion. Albeit official fluctuation bands were set at ±15% around the central rate, exchange rate 
stability was considered de facto in a -2.25% (depreciation) and +10% (appreciation) band against the euro. With 
this as a background, the hypothetical ERM II was constructed for Romania as to determine whether the 
Romanian leu would have had comply with exchange rate stability criterion. The results this simulation point out 
that the Romania leu is not yet prepared for facing the ERM II standards. 
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